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act, as to warrant discipline include: operating a disorderly house,
4 2
attempting to coerce women to prostitution,43 participating in a lynch-
ing,44 or engaging in abnormal sexual conduct.4 5 Such conduct dem-
onstrates an inherent unfitness, discipline being necessary even though
the conduct may not be related to the profession.
Not every private vice, however, will suffice to support a discipli-
nary proceeding.46 Frequenting a disorderly house47 and exhibiting
a violent temper and using abusive language4 s do not show such a high
degree of immoral and unethical conduct as to warrant discipline.
The court's power to discipline attorneys for misconduct in their
nonprofessional life is well established. No absolute rule, however, has
yet been established separating those offenses which do warrant dis-
cipline from those which do not. As a result, virtually every act of
misconduct could subject the attorney to discipline. It is submitted
that although disciplinary proceedings may be necessary to maintain
a high degree of respect for the legal profession, in order to justify
discipline courts should require a showing of moral turpitude.
JEFFREY GORDON HAVERSON
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
AND BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING
Conscientious objectors do not have a constitutional right to an
exemption from military service upon religious objections.' Once an
"In re Okin, 272 App. Div. 607, 73 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1947); In re Marsh, 42 Utah
186, 129 Pac. 411 (1913); In re Kosher, 61 Wash. 2d 206, 377 P.2d 988 (1963).
43In re Gould, 4 App. Div. 2d 174, 164 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1957), where an attorney
lured young women to his premises by help wanted advertisements, attempted to
induce them to commit prostitution and other immoral acts and made other in-
decent proposals. Accord, In re Kosher, 61 Wash. 2d 2o6, 377 P.2d 988 (1963).
"Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
45In re Heinze, 233 Minn. 391, 47 N.W.2d 123 (1951) (improper sexual conduct
with juvenile boys); In re Fleckenstein, 34 N.J. 20, 166 A.2d 753 (1961) (carnal
indecency).
"Drunkenness alone probably will not be sufficient to support a disciplinary
proceeding. Drunkenness may be a factor in a disciplinary proceeding where it is
coupled with some other form of misconduct. See In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168
S.W.2d 730 (1943); In re Osmond, 174 Okla. 561, 54 P.2d 319 (1935). Habitual and
public drunkenness has been held sufficient to warrant discipline. Wood v. State ex
rel. Boykin, 45 Ga. App. 783, 165 S.E. 908 (1932).
47People ex rel. Black v. Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 124 N.E. 807 (1919).
8State v. Metcalfe, 204 Iowa 123, 214 N.W. 874 (1927) (dictum); In re Wash-
ington, 82 Kan. 829, 1o9 Pac. 700 (1910).
'Keefer v. United States, 313 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1963); Korte v. United States,
260 F.2d 633 .(9th Cir. 1958); Uffelman v. United States, 23o F.2d 297 (9 th Cir. 1956);
CASE COMMENTS
exemption has been recognized by the legislature, however, it must be
made available on a nondiscriminatory basis.2 The establishment
of a conscientious objector exemption by Congress 3 has presented
the courts with serious legal considerations, since the exemption must
be broad enough to be free from constitutional objections,4 while
being narrow enough so as to admit of adjudication of an individual's
right to the exemption. 5 Meeting both of these requirements is diffi-
cult.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 19406 granted exemp-
tions from military service to any person "who, by reason of religious
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war
in any form." 7 The Universal Military Training and Service Act of
19488 added to this clause the further statement that: "Religious
training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially po-
litical, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code."9
In the recent case of United States v. Seeger,o this statutory "Su-
preme Being" clause was attacked as being a violation of the free estab-
lishment of religion and due process clauses of the first and fifth
amendments to the United States Constitution. Seeger claimed an
exemption from military service on the ground that due to his in-
dividual religious training and belief he was conscientiously opposed
to participation in war in any form. Because of his disbelief in the
existence of God he refused, however, to affirm or negate a belief
in a Supreme Being. Seeger contended that his was a "belief in and
White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1954); Imboden v. United States, 194
F.2d 5o8 (6th Cir. 1952); United States v. Monroe, 1.o F. Supp. 785 (S.D. Cal. 1957);
United States v. Alvies, 112 F. Supp. 6i8 (N.D. Cal. 1953); United States v. Newman,
44 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Ill. 1942); Koster v. Holz, 3 N.Y.2d 639, 148 N.E.2d 287,
171 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1958).
-Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
OUniversal Military Training 8- Service Act § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C.A.
App. § 4560) (1951).
'A declaration of unconstitutionality might void the exemption clause and leave
conscientious objectors without relief.
'There must be some objective basis by means of which the courts can test
satisfaction of the requirement. Otherwise, the law would be uncertain and indi-
viduals could not determine where they stand in relation to the exemption.
OSection 5(g)- 54 Stat. 889 (1940).
7ibid.
Supra note 3.
1Supra note 3, at 613.
2038o U.S. 163 (1965).
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devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious
faith in a purely ethical creed."" On this basis, Seeger was convicted
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York for refusal to submit to induction. The District Court found
Seeger to be sincerely opposed to participation in war because of his
religious training and belief, but denied the exemption to him since
his was not a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being."'1 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Seeger's con-
viction and declared the "Supreme Being" clause to be violative of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 3 The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari,' 4 and consolidated this case
with two others.15
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court entirely disregarded the constitutional question, and instead,
attempted to establish a judicial test by which the applicability of
the statutory "Supreme Being" clause to an individual seeking ex-
emption could be determined without arbitrarily classifying individual
beliefs. The Court said: "We believe ... the test of belief 'in a rela-
tion to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and
meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to
that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies
for the exemption."' 6
Since the Federal Government pre-empted the field of military
draft,'7 Congress has been unable to produce an entirely satisfactory
conscientious objector clause. The clauses either apply only to certain
religious sects and beliefs,' 8 or are so broad that almost anyone can
qualify.19
"Id. at 166.
1-216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
1326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
4377 U.S. 922 (1964).
'5United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), in which the defen-
dant had a humanistic belief which he felt would conflict with participation in
war. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
the conviction for failure to submit to induction on the ground that the lower court
did not dearly state its reasons for denying the exemption.
Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9 th Cir. 1963), in which the defendant
was not a member of a specific religious sect and whose belief in a Supreme Being
was doubtful, and the record did not contain evidence as to his sincerity, the
Unted States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a conviction for failure
to submit to induction.
"238o U.S. at 165-66.
"The first Federal Draft Law was passed in 1864. Supra note lo, at 170-71.
28See the Draft Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 78.
"Congress refused to adopt a provision exempting any person "'who is con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.'" Conklin, Conscientious
CASE COMMENTS
To meet the requirement of the exemption under the 194o Act,20
a person must be sincerely opposed, by reason of his religious training
and belief, to participation in war in any form. Although the courts
have had little difficulty applying the test of sincerity2' and opposition
to participation22 in war, they have been unable to agree upon what is
embodied in the term "religious training and belief."
Early cases indicated that membership in a specific religious sect,
whose tenets were opposed to participation in war, was a prerequisite
to the exercise of the exemption.23 Specific sect membership, however,
was quickly discarded as a prerequisite and attention was directed
toward the individual's belief.2 4 This did not result in a solution
since the type of individual belief remained undefined. Some courts
felt the requirement was met by the "existence of a conscientious
Objector Provisions: a View in the Light of Torcaso v. 'Watkins, 51 Geo L. J. 252,
270 (1963).
-Supra note 6.
21The following cases involved the sincerity of the individual's belief: Gonzales
v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955);
United States v. Corliss, 28o F.2d 8o8 (2d Cir. i96o); Parr v. United States, 272 F.2d
416 (9 th Cir. 1959); Selby v. United States, 250 F.2d 666 (gth Cir. 1957); Riles v.
United States, 223 F.2d 786 (sth Cir. 1955); Shepherd v. United States, 22o F.2d 855
(9th Cir. 1955); Pitts v. United States, 217 F.2d 590 (9 th Cir. 1954); Goetz v. United
States, 216 F.2d 270 (9 th Cir. 1954); Hinkle v. United States, 216 F.2d 8 (9 th Cir.
1954); Williams v. United States, 216 F.2d 35o (5th Cir. 1954); Roberson v. United
States, 2o8 F.2d 166 (0oth Cir. 1953); Koster v. Holz, 3 N.Y.2d 639, 148 N.E.2d 287,
171 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1958).
2rfhe following cases involved a question of opposition to participation in war:
United States v. Lauing, 221 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1955); Blevins v. United States, 217
F.2d 5o6 (9th Cir. 1954); Jessen v. United States 212 F.2d 897 (loth Cir. 1954); Pitts
v. United States, 217 F.2d 590 (gth Cir. 1954); Shepherd v. United States, 217 F.2d
942 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v. Close, 215 F.2d 439 (7 th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 970 (1955); Annett v. United States, 205 F.-d 689 (loth Cir. 1953); Taffs v.
United States, 2o8 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1953); United States v. Sage, 1i1 F. Supp. 33
(D. Neb. 1954). These cases deal with the issue of whether the indvidual's moral
acceptance of a willingness to take another's life in self-defense is evidence
conclusively rebutting the claim of objection to participation in war. It is generally
held that it does not. Contra, United States v. Jones, 142 F. Supp. 8o6 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
See also Bouziden v. United States, 251 F.2d 728 (ioth Cir. 1958).
'E.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
"Bradley v. United States, 348 U.S. 967 (1955); Simmons v. United States, 348
U.S. 397 (1955); United States v. Hartman, 209 F.-d 366 (2d Cir. 1954); Imboden v.
United States, 194 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1952); United States v. Macintosh, 42 F.2d
845 (2d Cir. 193o); United States v. Erikson, 149 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
Although, sect membership was thus an advantage, it was considered by many
to be an arbitrary classification. Since sect membership is no longer a prerequisite,
it may become a disadvantage since at least one case has held that an individual's
beliefs could not entitle him to an exemption if the tenets of his religious sect
themselves fell short of the requirement. Roberson v. United States, 2o8 F.2d 166
(1oth Cir. 1953).
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scruple against war in any form .... -25 Other courts felt it required an
orthodox belief in a deity.2 0 Intercircuit conflict resulted.27
To settle this conflict, Congress passed the 1948 Act 28 defining "re-
ligious training and belief" as an "individual's belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being .... -20 Instead of resolving the conflict, however,
the 1948 Act merely presented the courts with new terms to construe,
and the result was another conflict, this time as to what constitutes a
"belief in a relation to a Supreme Being." Some courts said it re-
quired an orthodox view of a deity,3 0 while others thought the clause
could be more liberally construed to mean any belief involving a
transcendental idea.31
Against this background, the Supreme Court in Seeger considered
what constitutes a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being."3 2 The
Court was faced with the difficult problem of construing the statute
broadly enough so as to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality,
while construing it narrowly enough so as to avoid a flood of litigation,
and still establishing a practical test for the lower courts to follow.
The Court indicated its desire to give the clause a constitutional
interpretation, fearing that voiding it, would leave conscientious ob-
jectors without any exemption.3 3 In the test adopted the Court sat-
isfies both the orthodox, by making the basic standard "the orthodox
belief in God.. .", and the more liberal, by making the exemption
available to those who possess beliefs "parallel" to that basic standard.
The test remains limited by the exceptions specifically announced in
the "Supreme Being" clause, which are still applicable.3 4
!-United States v. Kauten, 13 F.2d 7o3, 708 (2d Cir. 1943). Accord: United
States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944); United States ex rel. Phillips
v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
OBerman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
795 (1946); United States v. Knappke, 125 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
27E.g., Berman v. United States, supra note 26; United States v. Kauten, supra
note 25.
2Supra note 3.
2Supra note 3. The constitutionality of the "Supreme Being" clause was upheld
in the following cases: Etcheverry v. United States, 32o F.2d 873 (gth Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 93o (1963); Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9 th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied 352 U.S. 882 (1956); United States v. Bendik, 220o F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955);
George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
3°Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1956), cert, denied, 352 U.S.
882 (1956); United States v. Bendik, 22o F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955).
"Supra note 13.
338o U.S. at 165-66.
wIbid.
m"[B]ut does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal moral code .... Supra note 3. It appears, however, that these
types of beliefs may very well be "parallel" to a belief in an orthodox deity.
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The Supreme Court has, at least in theory, reached a compromise
in the intercircuit conflict.35 It is submitted that determining when
an individual's belief is sufficiently "parallel" to an "orthodox belief
in God" to entitle him to the exemption will be the next conscientious
objector conflict the Court will be asked to resolve.30
HENRY ANGEL
2Supra note 27.
O3This test requires a complete knowledge of an individual's psychology.
